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Introduction 
Joseph E. Stlglitz and Daniel Heymann 
Macroeconomic debt crises have been a part of the economic scene ever 
since the emergence of modern credit markets. Sovereign defaults go further 
back in history.1 From time to tiine, a certain consensus has arisen arnong 
influential econo1nists, policyn1akers and econon1ic agents that crises are "a 
thing of the past," at least in some countries which appear to have gained 
immunity for some reason or other. This complacency has been repeatedly 
disappointed - and was probably a major factor in its own disappoint1neot: 
it is in the nature of thos!" economic storms that they gather strength more 
easily when they are less expected (Kindleberger, 1978). Various economies, 
particularly but not only those labeled "emerging," have experienced a 
considerable number of crises, especially in the last 30 years (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2009). The recent Great Recession in the world economy and the still 
open Euro Zone crisis have shown that highly developed central econon1ies 
can also be vulnerable to debt-related macroeconomic disturbances of the 
first order of magnitude. 
Some decades ago, Hicks (1967) remarked that macroeconomics (or rnon-
etary theory) " ... beloI1gs to rnonetary history in a way that economic theory 
does not always belong to economic history ... Monetary theories arise out of 
monetary disturbances ... '' The argument applies especially to the analysis of 
macro crises, given their high social costs and theoretical interest. In fact, the 
study of critical events has a long history, starting much before the coining 
of the term "macroeconomics," as illustrated by the classic works of the nine-
teenth century, from Thornton (1802) to, say, Bagehot (1873), passing through 
Marx (1867-94). We still have 1nuch to learn, though. 
The reflection on macroeconomic crises requires theoretical frameworks 
that do not rule out as a matter of principle the very pheno1nena being studied. 
Crises put into doubt the relevance of rnodels that assun1e that self-equilibrating 
mechanisms work automatically in the economy and that economic decisions 
are based always and everywhere on a correct perception of the properties 
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of the environrne11t, even if possibly subject to random "exogenous" shocks 
extracted frorn a known distribution. 
Real-world macroecono1nic crises typically trigger widespread and "funda-
rnental" re-evaluations of the economy's prospects, arid an ir1tense search for 
lessons to be drawn for theories and policies. Tl1is ln1plicitly presumes that 
critical events supply material for redefining prior perceptions: the post-crisis 
n1acro n1odel (which will be used to interpret pre-crisis behaviors in retrospect) 
is likely to differ substantially front the previously prevalent representations of 
the econorny. The activity appears paradoxical if carried out under the precept 
that agertts n1ust be assun1ed unconditionally to forrn rational expectations and 
that, conseque1ttly, there re1nains nothing for them to learn about the furtc-
tioning of the economy (Stiglitz, 2011; Leijonhufvud, 2009; Heyrnann, 2007, 
2008). The analysis of n1acro crises cart certainly make good use of rational 
expectations models to represent sorne aspects of the events in question. At 
its core, however, trying to understand crises ineans developing preliminary 
schernes to picture situations where agents (and very likely, also economists) 
are hit by a realizatio11 that the economy did not work as they had thought it 
would. 
Beyond that, crises pose severe, and son1etiines dramatic, policy prob\e1ns, 
at the national and international levels. There is a challenging task ahead in 
searching to diagnose macroeconornic vulnerabilities, designing preventive 
measures, finding ways to manage critical disturbances if they do develop, and 
improving the chances of a good "life after debt," as our title goes. The works 
collected in the volume ailn at contributing to that activity. 
A fa111ily of events 
Economies in crisis: a heterogeneous collection 
Crises are often bunched in time and place. We usually speak of the Latin 
Arnerican episodes of the 1980s, or the Asian crises in the following decade. 
These com1nonalities may reflect shared structural features, which n1ake 
economies collectively sensitive to some classes of international impulses 
and various "contagion effects," or direct interdependences through trade 
or financial channels; behavioral similarities may also play a relevant role 
(for example, in the response to their crises of the 1980s, cour1tries of the 
Southern Cone of LatiI1 America adopted macro and reform policies which, 
although clearly not identical, showed analogous features). However, spe-
cific cases have their own idiosyncrasies. The set of episodes that can be 
readily categorized as debt crises show diverse characteristics in a variety of 
dimensions. 
An often-made critical distinction is between crises which begin in the 
public sector - with the inability of governments to repay what they owe and 
to roll over their outstanding debts - and those that begin in the private sector. 
Argentina and Greece belong to the former category; the 2008 crisis belongs 
to the latter. But the distinction is not always clear: a private sector crisis can 
easily morph into a public sector problem, for exarnple, when there is social-
ization of private debts, as happened both in the US and East Asian crises. 2 
l'here is, ttowever, one important distinction between crises brought or1 by 
the inability of the private and the public sector to repay debts. In the for1ner 
case, there is a clear legal frarnework of what should happen when a firm can11ot 
(or is not willing to) pay what it owes. (There are, of course, complex proble1ns 
that arise when there are systemic crises, with large numbers of fir1ns goi11g 
bankrupt.)3 But in the case of sovereign default, matters are more ambiguous. 
There is no clear legal framework, and it is not easy to ascertain whether a 
country could repay if it wanted to, for example, by raising taxes sufficiently. 
Another important distinction often n1ade is between crises which are a 
rnatter of liquidity and those which are a rnatter of solvency. In the former case, 
the presuinption is that the borrower could eventually repay what is owed - the 
borrower is sitnply not able to repay the a1nounts owed now, and can't find 
anyone to lend hirr1 the money. But the distinction is not so clear: if it were 
evident that the borrower is solvent, then presumably someone would be willing 
to make the loan. Typically, the debtor cannot get access to funds because no one 
has confidence that it can/will repay. Of course, the borrower may believe he 
is "solvent," and is only facing a temporary problem. But the borrower faces a 
liquidity problem because no potential lender shares that optimism. 
Of course, ex post, it turns out that in some of the cases where this pessilnisn1 
prevailed, the borrower does recover. The provision of liquidity by a "lender 
of last resort" (or the provision of funds to a country by the IMF) can "work," 
in the sense that tl1e loans are repaid and the borrower goes on to experience 
economic growth. Brazil (1998) provides a case in point. But there are many 
cases to the contrary: Russia did default, and even when the lender of last resort 
(the IMF) gets repaid, it may be largely at the expense of other creditors, who 
de facto become junior to the IMF debt. 
"fhere is a tendency to look at the factors that seerned central to the last crisis 
as central to deter1nining any country's vulnerability to future crises. In the 
aftermath of the Latin American crises of the 1980s, the focus was on public 
sector indebtedness; but excessive government spending played little role in 
the next crisis, the Mexican "Tequila" crisis of 1994-95, and no role at all in 
the East Asian crises of 1997-98: the governments had run surpluses. Mexico's 
low savings rate was sometimes blamed for that cour1try's crisis, but the East 
Asian countries had high savings rates. 
After East Asia, the focus shifted to the relative size of a country's short-ter1n 
indebtedness that is denominated in foreign exchange; but the North Atlantic 
financial crisis of 2008 showed that that variable was not so critical. 
4 Life After Debt 
Many critics of East Asia placed the blame on those countries' lack of trans-
parency. While transparency is clearly important - if one had all the relevant 
information, clearly one wouldn't lend to someone who would not be able 
to repay - there have been crises in the most transparent countries, those in 
Scandinavia.4 
The quest for finding the variables that would detern1ine, or at least predict, 
vulnerability to a crisis 11as been largely futile (Furman and Stiglitz, 1998). Part 
of the reason is the rich heterogeneity of circumstances of different countries. 
Econo1nies large and small, central and peripheral, 
rich and less rich 
Episodes of debt-related crisis in the last few decades have involved son1e of 
the largest world econornies (the US and Japan, aniong them) and others of a 
substantially s1naller size. Debt crises would seem more frequent in middle-
income economies, but over the decades a nun1ber of episodes have originated 
in wealthy countries. (Because very poor countries often have very limited 
access to credit and have very underdeveloped financial sectors, such crises are 
less likely to occur there.) 
Financial syste1ns with different sizes, configurations, sophistication of assets 
A n1acroeconon1ic debt crisis obviously cannot develop without the fuel of a 
substantial mass of financial obligations. That being given, crises have been 
observed in economies with quite different degrees of financial depth (or 
financialization). The stock of financial assets/liabilities in the US before the 
recent crisis was several times larger than the annual value of GDP, and fam-
ously included a sizable volume of highly cotnplicated derivatives, which were 
1neant in principle to i1nprove the allocation of risks and reduce systemic fra-
gility, but 1nay have ended up doing the opposite. 
However, in other instances, "innovative" financial products did not feature 
proininently.5 Crises have occurred in financial systems operated mostly on 
the basis of traditional bank !ending and simple bonds. (Indeed, traditional 
Minsky credit cycles are associated with plain vanilla banking.) 
The deno1nination of the debt 
In countries like the US and Japan, the national currency served as the usual 
unit of denomination of a credit. In contrast, the Argentine crisis of the early 
2000s occurred i11 an econon1y with relatively low ratios of liabilities to GDP 
before the collapse, but where most of the debts that went into default consisted 
of simple, dollar- denomi11ated instruments. 
Typically, governments that issue debt in their own currency cannot face 
a conventional sovereign debt crisis: forn1al repayment can be accon1plished 
simply by turning on the printing presses/' 
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So too, governments that have borrowed in their own currency can reduce 
the real value of what they owe through Inflation (if they have long-term debt.)7 
But, wl1ile seigniorage financing in n1oderate volumes may be an effective 
instrument of debt reduction, so long as inflation remains nlild, strong doses 
are likely to prove disruptive. A government that is perceived to be engaged in 
inflationary policies may not be able to get access to new funds, and the sudden 
stop of an inflow of credit can itself precipitate a crisis. 
Varieties of 1nonetary, exchange reghnes and policies 
Debt crises occur in countries with a range of exchange rate systen1s. It used 
to be thought that the best exchange rate regimes were the polar cases - either 
rigidly fixed or freely floating, and that 1na11aged exchange rate regiines were 
particularly vulnerable. On this basis, the IMF recommended that coun-
tries adopt one of tl1e polar for1ns. But we have seen crises in countries with 
"pure" floating reginies (US, Japan), as well as those with currency boards 
with rigid convertibility (as rigid as cat1 be - since in practice even "strictly 
fixed" exchange rates do change) at a constant rate (for exarnple, Argentina 
1991-2001). They occur too in circumstances where there has been integration 
into a regional monetary area (for exaniple, Greece). Crises can occur under 
an autonon1ous national monetary management, and also in the co1nplete 
absence of a country-specific rnonetary policy. Debt troubles may e1nerge in 
very different inflationary environments. To mention exa1nples of a single 
country, the Argentine collapse of 2001/2002 was preceded by a period of 
no1ninal deflation, while the crisis of the early 1980s developed in a context of 
high inflation (over 80 percent a year). 
Capital inflows, not always 
The accumulation of ultin1ately unsustainable foreign debts (by governrnents 
and/or private sectors) as the counterpart of current account deficits was 
a feature of a variety of crises, especially in emerging econon1ies. But asset 
market bubbles and dotnesti.c financial boom-bust cycles also arose in econ-
omies (fapan, the US in the 1920s) which ran international surpluses and had 
positive net lending flows to the rest of the world. 
Governinent or twin deficits, someti1nes 
In some instances, difficulties in servicing the public debt, or outright gov-
ern1nent default, are at the epicenter of the macroeconomic quake. Lax fiscal 
policies in the boom can also indirectly stimulate an unsustainable spending 
and borrowing expansion of the private sector in open economies with access 
to foreign credit. "Twin deficits" have been a salient element of crises, for 
example, in Greece recently, and in several Latin American episodes. However, 
there are other cases where the origin of a crlsis can be identified directly 
in private sector over-indebtedness, with the government running measured 
surpluses (as, for example, with the cases of Ireland in the 2000s, or Chile in the 
buildup of its crisis in the 1980s). The connection between public and private 
budget constraints works in both phases of the cycle. A "bubbly" growth in 
private spending can transitorily boost fiscal revenues. But this mav mask what 
would appear to have been ir1 retrospect the buildup of large contingent Habil-
ities for the public sector, if after a crash the governinent engages in bailout 
operations to rescue troubled groups of private debtors. 
f'amily characteristics: broken promises and frustrated 
wealth expectations 
Macroecono1nic debt crises, with all their heterogeneity, have a comrnon defining 
feature in the (actual or feared) non-fulfillrnent of large masses of financial 
obligations. Bankruptcy at1d default are incon1patible with perfect foresight.a A 
default perfectly and unanimously anticipated froin its origin will not happen 
(because no one will advance resources against an en1pty promise). 
1'hus, debt crises can only be studied in models in which there is uncer-
tainty - in which at least at the tiine loans are made, the lenders think there 
is at least some chance of being repaid. Of course, for all but a few borrowers, 
lenders recognize that there is a chance of non-repayrnent, and thus demand 
an interest rate that is in excess of the safe rate of interest (and greater than the 
rate paid by the US governrnent for a loan of comparable maturity). Jn prin· 
ciple, the non-execution of a payrnent commitrnent written as if it should be 
realized uncor1ditionaHy, could possibly be viewed as implenienting an iniplicit 
contingency clause in the contract. Non-payment would then represent what 
everyone should, and does, expect according to the contract under the observed 
circumstances. Luck determined a bad outcome froin a distribution of external 
conditions which, by assunlption, was optirnally conternplated by the parties 
when they agreed on tlte contract. What went wrong was due to blind chance~ 
it n1ay be deplored, but should cause no regrets to anyone. 
The argument just mentioned points to the ainbiguity of the notion of default. 
The existence of interest prerniums implies that, somehow, the prospect of 
non-payment of the debts in certain states of the world has been contemplated 
as part of the "normal course of events." Also, in assessing the profits and losses 
of the parties in a contract, it should be considered that a lender is hurt when 
a stream of prornised payinents is interrupted, but the dan1age could be (and, 
on average, in a world with a modicum of rationality, would be) more than 
offset by tl1e profits frorn holding high-yield claims before default occurred. In 
this view, debt restructurings are both anticipated (in the sense that creditors 
know that these restructurings will happen under certain contingencies) and 
are welfare increasing, since implicitly, what appears as a pure debt contract 
contains within it an element of equity, of risk sharing. 
Such restructurings need not lead to crises. Indeed, the large declines in 
incomes often observed in debt crises (in this perspective) are not because 
of the debt crisis so much as because of the adverse shocks that led to the 
crisis; the debt restructuring can be an in1portant element in helping countries 
absorb such adverse shocks. 
But when there is a large amount of debt, adverse shocks can lead to a crisis 
for a slightly different reason: in a world with credit rationing, the adverse 
shock, if large enough, can lead to a sudden cessation of the flow of credit fron1 
abroad, with severe macroeconon1ic consequences (Gersovitz et al., 1986). 
We should note that for developing countries (and increasingly for developed 
countries) the adverse shocks are often not soniething that happens internally, 
but a change in the flow of funds abroad, as a result, for instance, of a change 
in monetary policy in the United States or a change in risk perceptions. 
However, for the most part crises do not correspond to the image of events 
which, though unpleasant, can be taken serenely as part of a well-defined 
"natural randomness of things." Crises negate ratio11al expectations. Jt is 
not just that a bad outcome that they realized might happen has happened. 
Typically, crises lead to changes in views of the world. They are meniorable 
incidents that remain in the rninds of people who live through them, and 
often serve as historical lat1dmarks long after their time. For large groups of 
people, a crisis does not call for moving ahead along a particular branch of a 
predetermined decision tree. Rather, agents living in a crisis perceive poten-
tially life~changing transformations in their environments, calling then1 to 
reconsider attitudes, beliefs and behavior patterns. Policymakers are likely to 
be in the same predicament: the crisis proved them wrong (those in power, at 
least) and now they, and society as a whole, must come to a new understanding 
of the world, and in doing so fi11d their way out of a mess.9 
The Queen of England famously asked about the financial crisis in the UK 
"It's awful ... Why did nobody see it coming?" TI1e answer was not that the 
economy had been hit by a well-identified shock whose likelihood of occur· 
rence was known to be given by certain probability distribution. Rather, some 
years later (December 2012, in a visit to the Bank of England), the Queen 
answered her own question: "People got a llttle lax ... perhaps it's difficult to 
foresee fa crisisj."10 By the very t1ature of debt crises, the difficulty that many 
people find in anticipating their appearance is an intrinsic part of tl1e process 
that generates then1. 
Crises substantially 1nodify the scenarios wl1ere people carry out their eco-
no1nic activities. They represent a point of discontinuity: Most in1portantly, 
fro1n a macroecono1nic perspective, large groups perceive thernselves, and 
the econo1ny as a whole, poorer than once thought. These are "awful" events, 
where the estimates of a country's wealth get revised downwards. And this 
leads to marked changes in behavior. 11 
8 Lifr After Debt 
Solvency, or debt sustainability, are intrinsically prospective and subjective 
notions: the relevant "fundamentals" can only be determined by forming 
some fallible conjectures (cf. Keynes, 1936, esp. chapter 12; 1937). In a crisis, 
big classes of borrowers are seen to lack the earning capacity required to service 
their obHgations.12 Their currently anticipated flows of future incomes (in terms 
of the relevant units of denornination13) fall short of the expected levels that 
supported the creation of the debts. The consequences reverberate across the 
economy. In the aggregate, the process amounts to a collective recalculation of 
the economy's prospective growth trend (see Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007; Boz 
et al., 2008; Guzn1.3.n, 2013; Heymann et al., 2001). In the boom phase, big 
segn1ents of agents (and, probably, analysts) acted as if they perceived that the 
economy was operating on a solid trend; now the same performance is viewed 
as an unviable temporary bubble. 
These changes of mood are a marking feature of debt cycles. In the title of 
the great book Manias, Panics and C'rashes, Kindleberger (1978) vividly sketches 
a picture of crises as dramas where actors are moved successively by emotions 
of high euphoria and deep fear. Indeed, in the course of big macro fluctuations, 
relevant agents sometimes seem to behave as if they thought that nothing 
n1ay go wrong, only to fall shortly afterwards into panicky flight or gloomy 
depression. 
However, crises do not appear to be sirnple consequences of "irrational 
exuberance" (cf. Greenspan, 1996; Schiller, 2000), as a sort of macroeco11omic 
bipolar disorder. Pre·crisis boorns tend to show conforrnist attitudes by soph is-
ticated agents, who do not appear to be tltinking or acting under the influence 
of psychological "high spirits." At their tin1e, boorns that ended in crises could 
be rationalized in ways that left sober agents satisfied to play along for quite 
a while. While, as Kindleberger points out, at the time these exuberant actors 
believe that they are not part of a collective tnania - and even go to great 
efforts to distinguish the current situation from earlier bubbles where such 
irrationality was in evidence - in fact lt is hard to deny that the social con-
tagion of beliefs have played an important role in the credit bubbles that typ-
ically precede debt crises.14 
Behaviors that lead to crises need not embody eccentric expectatior1s or 
opinions contradicting the established beliefs of the times. Rather, they often 
appear as variants of prevalent views and attitudes. The anticipation that price 
stabilization and structural reforrns along accepted lines would drastically raise 
productivity levels supported a positive interpretation of current account defi-
cits in Argentina in the 1990s (see Galiani et al., 2003). In the path to the 
recer1t crisis technical improvements and benefits derived frorr1 the changing 
patterns of the international division of labor were expected to expand pro-
ductive opportunities in the US and validate the increase in leveraged expen-
ditures: the "new economy" would be able to manage its debts, helped by the 
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availability of innovative financial instruments that would allow it to diversify 
risks. Would not a country like Greece, having adopted European institutiot1s 
and the cornmon currency, enter a process of convergence towards European 
income levels, where the Balassa-Sarnuelson effect would result in an equi-
Iibriurn real appreciation, and where the use of foreign credit could be seen as 
a natural consequence of anticipations of future prosperity? 
Of course, contrary opinions were also expressed. However, the burden of the 
proof seemed to be on the dissenting arguments and, as a matter of fact, they 
did not carry a decisive power of conviction, sufficient to modify behaviors. 
Indeed, proponents of the conventional wisdom under which the economy 
was not at risk could not really fatl1om the arguments to the contrary.15 The 
rationalizing argu1ner1ts looked qualitatively plausible. In those conditior1s, 
performance indicators such as rising debt ratios (later to be called perhaps a 
credit mania) n1ay have been interpreted in a positive light, as signs that savers 
ar1d financiers shared optimistic attitudes and were willing to participate in 
the expansion by financing l1igher spending levels. 
In Hemingway's novel The Sun Also Rises (1926), a character is asked how he 
went bankrupt. The short a11swer was: "Two ways. Gradually, then suddenly." 
The history of crises shows substantial variatio11s in the timeframe of expecta-
tions and decisions as the process evolves. In the phase of debt buildups, the 
disposition to lend and to borrow suggests that people trust their ability to 
rnake forecasts over not-too-short periods. Prosperity itself helps to strengthen 
those views, as it tends to be interpreted as an indication of an underlying 
strength in the economy's growtl1 potential. The possibility that Minsky 
fragilities rnay be developing is not take11 at first as a relevant cause to worry. 
The boom that precedes the bust lulls rnarket participants irtto the belief that 
macroeconomic risk is low, and therefore that investors can take on more debt 
and leverage. The change in 1nood tends to happen slowly at the beginning. 
In terms of "categorical thinking" (Mullainathan, 2002), where agents do not 
rnodify their beliefs continuously, but use a classification in discrete scenarios 
to guide their behavior, the evidence that may start coining in tl1at borrowers 
are not generating the cash flows to service debts is likely to be interpreted as 
circumstantial, and not requiring a change in the operative perception of an 
economy on track. 
If news about rising problerns keeps accurnulating (in the case of an episode 
driven by private sector debt, sig11s like growing arrears in repayments, indica-
tions tl1at the increase in asset prices rnay have gone too far, maybe a leveling 
of aggregate demand) the speed of reactions can quicken substantially. What 
once used to be named financial deepening gets increasingly called a debt 
bubble. 
Crises are "big events." Bankruptcies or defaults mark discontinuities. Besides 
the loss iI1 perceived (or pseudo*) wealth, there is a change in real wealth as a 
result of bankruptcy costs, a change in distribution, and a change in controL 
They open a new history, without implying an immediate resolution of past 
issues. When the eventuality of a crisis emerges, people can perceive that the 
economy is approaching a bifurcation; either avoid the worst and son1ehow 
regain balance, or go into a tailspin. This is likely to be a phase of increased 
policy activity, and rising public demand for "reassuring signs." Naturally, 
at that point people wiU watch more and more anxiously the n1ornent-by-
moment pieces of information that may indicate whether the economy is 
close to tipping one way or another.' 6 This leads to a shortening of planning 
and decision horizons, and induces volatility of expectations. Self-reinforcing 
avalanches in financial markets become more likely. 17 Solvency and liquidity 
problen1s get more mixed up than in tranquil times: the (provisional) proof 
of solvency is paying punctually, now. The supply of credit now contracts, 
and real activity is likely to fall. In most cases, the ability of monetary author-
ities to loosen rnonetary policy, sufficient to offset the credit contraction very 
lintited.18 
It n1ay happen that economies come close to a full-fledged crisis, but rnanage 
to avoid it, and recover (for example, Brazil in 2002). The n1ore renietnbered 
episodes are those where the outcon1e goes the other way. In some instances, 
the manifestation of the crisis may have as milestones particular dates or 
events, like major devaluations, declarations of government default, or failures 
of large banks or corporations. The European experience of the last years shows 
cases where, although there is not a c!in1actic breakdown, the economy gets 
stuck in a prolonged state of malaise as the effects of excessive debts linger on, 
without a clear-cut resolution; this also would apply to Japan's "balance sheet 
recession" (Koo, 2003; Greenwald and Stig!itz, 1993, explain why recovery 
fron1 a balance sheet recession n1ay be very slow.). 
The eruption of a crisis re1noves sorne uncertainties (the collapse has 
happened), and creates others. Losses have to be processed throughout the 
economy: their 1nagnitude and distributive ir1cidence remain to be deter-
mined, and their multiple rounds of effects to be worked out. 
In those conditions, further disturbances of credit are to be expected. 
Diverse channels of financial propagation have been extensively discussed 
in the recent literature. 19 The various mechanisms inay work with different 
intensity according to the case, and particularly the configuration of the 
financial syste1n. However, the different effects point in a silnilar direction, of 
a tightening of credit constraints even of high-productivity borrowers due to a 
variety of effects: a weakening of bank balance sheets, worsening expectations, 
perceptions of increased risk, a fall in the price of assets used as collateral, and 
an increased fragility of banks. Each of these can turn into a self-feeding spiral; 
for instance, the increased fragility of banks n1ay lead to an even stronger con-
traction in lending, weakening the econo1ny further. Thus, instead of helping 
to smooth the impact of the shock, credit rnarkets operate as amplifiers, with 
positive feedbacks aggravating solvency arld liquidity problems. 
Moreover, financial restrictions contribute to induce a segmentation of 
agents between those who maintain their earning capacity and hold assets 
which re1nain liquid, and those who face strict constraints. Large nun1bers of 
agents are Hrnited in their possibilities to spend on goods and services. For tl1e 
currently less restricted sets of people, the situation is likely to motivate appre-
hension about the future: this would induce "voluntary" cuts in expenditures, 
and stronger flexibility/liquidity preference. While these changes lead to an 
increase in the savings rate, the simultaneous decrease in consu1nption and 
credit availability leads to a simultaneous decrease in invest1nent. This is a 
typical scenario for a traditional savings-investrnent inconsistency, and raises 
the possibility of large-scale effective demand failures (Leijonhufvud, 1973). 
An economy does not undergo a substantial drop in its level of activity pro-
portionally, or gracefully. A strong shock on wealth, incomes and spending 
Inust ilnply considerable sectorial reallocations and distributive shifts. Market 
adjustrnents in wages, prices, arid interest rates n1ay in fact be disequi!ibrating 
(Stiglitz, 2013). 20 Lor1ger-run trends that tend to induce changes in the structure 
of production can contribute to keep low the aggregate level of output, if 
1nobility between occupations is limited (cL Delli Gatti et al., 2012). In a large-
scale crisis, son1e productive activities (especially those that were particularly 
i11volved in the bubble) reduce their production levels sharply; some types of 
human skills experience a strong diminution in value; and because of credit 
constraints, individuals rnay not be able to finance the investrnents required to 
enable them to acquire the skills to 1nove to alternative occupations. Finding 
a new place in the labor inarket when the old abilities have little or no market 
value can be difficult and thne-consuming, apart from personally painful; a 
willingness to accept a salary cut may not suffice to regain work.21 This effeCt 
can contribute to a jump in the une1nployment rate. 
Remarks on policies 
A macroecono1nic crisis is a (possibly understandable) policy failure, by action 
or 01nission. Economic policies cannot avoid being concerned about crises, 
in the different stages of their evolution. According to the old saying, French 
generals in the 1930s prepared themselves thoroughly to fight and win the pre-
vious war. The design of economic policies should avoid getting into H1e sa1ne 
predicament of seeking to avoid the behaviors that led to the fast crisis. Crises 
do not repeat themselves, as we have seen; innovation (real and financial) 
implies that the sante (or closely similar) econo1nic configurations and behav-
iors will not be encountered in the future. 
While, in some sense, each crisis is sui generis, the previous discussion has 
made clear that there are son1e common elements. Crises, and especially debt 
crises, are often marked by credit and asset bubbles. In the run·up to the 2008 
crisis, policyrnakers in the US were wont to brush off concerns about bubbles 
(partially in the belief that markets are "rational" and therefore that bubble 
simply don't exist) by saying that you can't tell a bubble until after it breaks. 
But while one can't be sure that there is a bubble until after it breaks, all policy-
making is done under uncertainty. One could have been fairly sure, for instance, 
as the price of housing relative to 1nedian income soared to unprecedented 
levels that there was a bubble. Equally to tl1e point, there are asynunetric costs 
and benefits of taking actions: the costs of taking actior1s to have dampened, 
and perhaps prevent, the bubble were ar1 order of magnitude sn1aller than the 
benefits that would have been derived from such actions. 
In short, policies should prepare thernselves to adopt preverttive measures 
if signs of danger en1erge and, when these do not prove effective, to face the 
management of disruptions of different intensity. These are huge issues, with 
large-scale economic and political (distributive) implications. We limit our-
selves to some brief remarks. 
Prevention 
Crisis prevention rneans inducing behaviors that avoid large-scale econo1nic 
mistakes. Tl1ere are three sources of market failures: (a) Large macroeconornic 
externalities. Market participants do not take into account the effects of their 
actions on others, leading to phenomena such as excessive borrowing and 
excessive reliance on foreign· denominated debt. (see Korinek, 2010, 2011).22 
The "too-big-to-fail" banks in the US did riot take into account how their actions 
could lead to syste1nic risk and a crisis. (b) Agency problerns, so that decision 
rnakers rnay not even take into account the consequences of their actions for 
their own firrn. Part of the reason for Greenspan's failure to anticipate the 
excessive risk undertaken by banks is that lie ignored these agency problems; 
if he had only looked at the incentive structures facing bank managers, he 
would have anticipated that they would undertake highly risky action. (c) Poor 
judgment - beliefs that are inconsistent with "reality." Many of those in the 
financial market det1ied the possibility that there was a bubble. 
Policy1nakers cart (and should) have different objectives than private actors. 
They are paid to think about externalities and agency problen1s. Their job is to 
focus on the systernic consequences that migl1t arise if there is a kind of col-
lective bias in market beliefs. Thus, if regulators and policymakers do what they 
are supposed to do, it is not necessarily because they are smarter than rnarkets. 
It is because what they strive to do is different fron1 what private firms strive to 
do (which is to rnaximize profits in ways that do not get thern into jail). 
Policymakers must assess the sustainability of the economic path that is being 
generated by private expectatim1s and behaviors. This intrinsically forward-
!ookir1g exercise can hardly be reduced to the application of mechanical rules, 
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and may itself be a source of errors. (Certai11ly America's policyrnakers failed, 
but it was partly because they bought into the idea that they couldn't and 
shouldn't second guess the niarket.) 
The game is one witll high stakes and considerable uncertainty. However, 
policymakers are engaged in playing it whether they act or abstain. Benign 
neglect when a bubble develops will not prevent the consequences. There are 
real questions about the adequate mix of ex. ante policies and post-crisis inter-
ventions: the first must be based on conjectures, but "rnopping up after the 
crash" catches the eco1101ny already in difficulties, can be very expensive, and, 
if anticipated, n1ay distort private incentives Oeanne and Korinek, 2012). In 
any case, the notion that policies can passively wait until a bubble bursts and 
rely on variants of the "Greenspan put" overestimates the capacity to stop a 
macro disruption in mid-course, while it minimizes the social costs of a crisis, 
and the distributional irnpact of bailouts (Stiglitz, 2010b). 
Preventive policies put tl1ernselves in the way of expansions that may, or 
may not, ultimately prove ur1sustainable. Tl1e choice of the tirning or intensity 
of policy actions risks errors of both types: too n1ucl1 too soon, or too little too 
late. The mix of instruments, particularly between monetary and fiscal pol-
icies, can also be a matter of discussion. Policies of crisis prevention can affect 
real growth immediately; their benefits are delayed, and may reniain hypo-
thetical (the nor1-event that a potential crisis does not occur). The opposite 
11appens with non-action. Inunediate political incentives may be biased in the 
direction of the latter; nobody wants to be a party pooper, especially when the 
bubble is generating huge profits for key actors in the private sector, who are 
often willing to share a fraction of those rents with political actors, to induce 
them not to interfere. The analysis above about the sources of market failures 
provides some guidance for preventive policies. 
"Good bye financial repression, hello financial crash," said Diaz Alejandro 
(1985) in his analysis of the Latin American financial reforms of the late 1970s. 
The regulatory cycles of the last decades have not reached a stationary point. 
Governments have tried to act as if the financial sector could take care of itself, 
only to step up and assume large losses when banks were at peril (through the 
socialization of private debts or the purchases of dubious assets in the tnidst of 
an emergency). The history of the last forty years, since the beginning of the 
liberalization movement in the late 1970s, is the history of one bailout after 
another; and while the bailouts typically have the name of a country associ-
ated with them, they are really bailouts of the lenders, and, in particular, the 
international banks. 
The international financial crisis shOW"ed that arrangements (such as uni-
versal banking, credit default swaps, or even diversification) believed to promote 
risk-spreading may end up in effect amplifying systemic risks. Standard capital 
require1nents can act pro-cyclically, rather than moderating financial swings. 
Size and connectivity of financial agents are double-edged features (see, for 
example, Nier et al., 2008; Gai and Kapadia, 2010; Battiston et aL, Z012a, 
2012b; Gallegati et al., 2008; Haldane, 2009; Haldane and May, 2011). The 
reconsideration of regulatory frameworks has to deal with the intricate links 
between the architecture of the financial system, the exposure of the system to 
risks (and the correlation of the shocks) and its vulnerability. In a sector where 
the race betwee11 the measures of the regulators and the maneuvers of avoid~ 
a11ce by the regulated is especially intense, policy provisio11s (like liability rules 
or restrictio11s on bonuses) which may modify incentives of financial managers 
also seem relevant parts of the package (cf. Leijonhufvud, 2010). 
The hazards and sources of financial fragility are related to the types of assets 
issued and traded. Ultra-sophisticated instrun1ents, as has been seen fron1 the 
performance of derivative markets in the 2000s, are apt to turn into factors of 
confusion rather than tools to improve the allocation of risks. This is especially 
the case when there is a lack of transparency (for example, in over the counter 
derivatives). Syn1metrically, vulnerabilities may also derive from a poor or 
unbalanced menu of assets. As a salient instance, the prevalence of contracts 
in foreign currencies was a major element h1 crises in "emerging" economies 
over the years. Those units of denomination are ii! adapted to such econo1nies, 
sine€' domestic incornes are likely to have a highly variable purchasing power in 
terms of the curre11cies in which money is borrowed. Crisis preventio11 would 
then include policies to induce "de-dollarization," and encourage the use of the 
domestic currency in writing debts, particularly macroecono1nic frameworks 
tending to reduce income arid price volatilities. The seard1 for improvements 
in contractual arrangements has also emerged pron1inently at international 
levels, especially in relation to sovereign debts. The matter is treated in several 
contributions to this volume (see Miller and Zhang, 2014; Barr et al., 2014; 
Schneider, 2014; also Basu and Stiglitz, 2014). 
While there is still no unanimity about the set of appropriate preventive 
rneasures - measures for which the expected benefits exceed the costs -
there is a broad consertsus around several 1neasures: (a) more transparency; 
(b) reducing incentives for excessive risk taking, for example, associated with 
too big to fail, too interconnected to fail, or too correlated to fail banking struc-
tures; (c) reducing opportunities for excessive risk taking in "core" banks, for 
exan1ple, by restricting proprietary trading (the Volcker rule), by ring-fencing 
(partially restoring divisions between investment and commercial banking), 
ar;d by not allowing governn1ent insured institutions to write derivatives; 
(d) circumscribing the shadow banking syste1n, n1uch of which exists simply 
to circumvent regulations imposed on the regular banking system to promote 
economic stability; (e) macroprudential regulations, designed to ensure that 
the financial system acts in a counter-cyclical rather than pro*cyclical manner, 
including provisioning requirements, and speed bumps. 
··11 
? 
Debt represents fixed obligations, and other things being equal (which they typ-
ically are not), witl"t a.fixed set of debt obligations, the greater economic vola-
tility, the more likely it is that there will be a debt crisis. Hence, an important 
aspect of crisis prevention is limiting exposure to risks and ensuring that 
whatever shocks that buffet an economy are dampened rather than an1plified. 
The nature of the economic regime obviously affects both exposure to shocks 
and the extent of amplification (and persistence) of shocks. The East Asian crisis 
as well as n1any otl1er crises have widely been bla1ned on capital and financial 
market liberalization, which exposed the countries to n1ore external shocks. 
Financial deepenirtg (high levels of margin), it has been suggested, may give 
rise to amplification. While economies should respond to a greater exposure to, 
say, external shocks by undertaking lower levels of debt, the adjustments in 
debt levels often h'ave not been sufficiently deep, partly perhaps because of the 
niarket failures to wl;ich we referred earlier, arid partly because the "reforrns" 
that led to greater exposure to risk sin1ultaneously led to greater financial 
deepening.23 
Macro managernent of debt crises 
Can prevention fully succeed in eliminating debt crises, or close threats? 
Possibly not, at least in economies with substantial volu1nes of financial obli-
gations. Macro policies in situations of strong disturbances to credit markets 
will be conditioned by the characteristics of the perturbation and the means 
available to the government. 
we can distinguish two sets of government policies: Those that deal directly 
with the debt problem, and those that deal with the rnacroeconomic conse-
quences that we have discussed earlier. Of course, the two are related: allowing 
the economy to sir1k into recession or depression will exacerbate debt prob-
lems. Even if a cou11try did not have a debt problem before the recession, it wi'Il 
eventually have one if the downturn is prolonged, 
Debt, as Stiglitz emphasizes in his paper in this volume, is simply money 
that son1e people owe to others. In rnuch of the standard macro-theory, dis-
tribution doesn't rnatter; and even if the standard micro-theory, the distri~ 
bution of wealth (or changes in the distribution of wealth) sl1ouldn't affect 
the ability of the economy to achieve full employment, But, of course, eacl1 
individual does care about the size of the slice of the economic pie that lie 
gets. The easiest resolution of debt crises, entailing, for irtstance, the simple 
cancellation or restructuring of debt, are typically not on the table, at least at 
the beginning of the crisis, though, eventually, creditors often do accept sig-
nificant debt restructurings. (Debt restructurings involving a rolling over of 
debt and a lengthening of tf;e maturity structure are often attempted, in tt1e 
hope that the country or fir1n is sirnply facing a liquidity crisis rather than a 
solvency crisis. As we comn1ented earlier, the distinction betwee11 the two is 
often not clear; and often a sirnple extension of the maturity structure doesn't 
work: sornetime later there is a debt write-down.) 
When a single firm has trouble paying what it owes, there is a simple pro-
cedure for debt restructuring; but when there are many firms that owe rnoney 
to each other, there is no such easy working out of the situation: the value of 
each firm depends on what it receives fron1 others, who may also not be paying 
their debts. There is a cornplex simultaneity problem; Miller and Stiglitz (1999, 
2010) argue that this should be dealt with through a special bankruptcy pro-
cedure that they caU a "super Chapter 11!' 
Bankruptcy entails shareholders losing some or all of their claims on the 
assets of the firm and some or all of their control to creditors. Bankruptcy 
law provides for an orderly way by which clairns are resolved and, at least in 
Chapter 11 of the US bankruptcy code, creditors are given a fresh start. But 
there is no corresponding legal fra1nework for the resolution of sovereign debts. 
As several papers in this volun1e argue, using GDP bonds as part of sovereign 
debt restructuring can be thought of as providing an analogous mechanisrn for 
sovereigns, although their usefulness may be li1nited by low market valuations 
when they are issued.21 
As we noted earlier, debt crises are often associated with sudden changes in 
the expectations of market participants, in ways that lead to the destruction of 
perceived wealth and thus to abrupt reductions in aggregate effective den1and. 
These changes in aggregate effective demand can be so large that adjustments 
in wages, prices, and interest rates cannot easily offset them. The proble1ns are 
exacerbated if financial institutions and other creditors decide by reasons of 
caution, or are forced by their own illiquidity, to contract their lending. The 
economy plunges into recession or depression, exacerbating the debt crisis; 
whether it originally was a private or public debt crisis, it soon becomes a 
national debt crisis. 
If governments have the required fiscal space, they can (at least partially) 
step into the breach, for exa1nple, by direct stimulation of the economy, by 
bailing out the banks and restoring their lending capacity, and/or by facili~ 
tating debt restructuring, to make the apparent losses of the creditor smaller 
and, therefore, more acceptable. But, in order to perfor1n those functions, the 
government must be able to raise funds in appropriate amounts and terms, zs a 
particularly difficult require1nent if public finances are already under stress.26 
That is why ex ante precautio11ary rneasures such as the accumulation of actual 
or contingent resources (in forms like foreign reserves, access to credit or taxing 
capacity, as the case may be) that can be accessed quickly in en1ergencies is so 
important. 
At the early stages in a crisis, traditional arguments for lender of last resort 
operations beco1ne relevant when many private debtors are perceived to be 
in jeopardy, and there are risks of a destructive avalanche of self-reinforcing 
credit contraction in the absence of intervention. Avoiding a debt deflation 
process is then a prio1ity. Direct actions on credit markets, where the urgent 
problerns appear to be, seem a natural first line of defense. 
The ability of policies to sustain the supply of credit depends on the assets 
that the public wants to hold. In so1ne economies, the domestic money and 
governn1ent bonds are perceived as safe refuges by potential lenders, and their 
demand actually rises in a private sector crisis. This is not a general case. When 
the public sectors are less trusted, and the demand is for sorne "outside" asset 
(central currencies, or gold in its times), an "external drain" can combine with 
"interr1al drain" (as was feared by Bagehot in the England of the 1870s) and lead 
to a financial and currency twin crisis (cf. Kan1i11sky and Reinhart, 1999). The 
resulting n1ovements in exchange rates can further exacerbate the debt crisis, 
especially when there is a currency n1is1natch between assets and liabilities. 
Government lending operations in a crisis imply taking perhaps consid-
erable credit risks. What may appear as conventional monetary policies morph 
into "quasi-fiscal" operations with long-lasting effects on the liabilities of the 
public sector. In some instances (for example, Latin America in the 1980s) these 
consequences can contribute to turn a debt crisis into a high inflation trend. 
But even when the government does not engage in lending operations, there 
can be severe budgetary consequences, as has been evident in the 2008 crisis. 
The eco1101nic contractions reduce revenues, and the attempts by governrnent 
to stin1ulate the economy, even when partially successful, represent a drain on 
the fisc. 
Distributive repercussions are present in any event, since the interventions 
shift the allocation of losses from insolvencies, besides hopefully moderating 
their aggregate volume. In the inidst of an economic turmoil, it is good if 
policymakers are able to discriminate between assisting bank stockholders, 
managers, workers and organizations, or depositors. The Swedish experience 
of the 1990s is interesting in this regard (see Jonung, 2009). A key criticism of 
the US rescue of the banks in the 2008 crisis was that too rnuch of the 111oney 
went to bailout shareholders and bondholders and to support the incomes of 
the managers. 
Those rneasures often prove insufficie11t, however. Debt purchases by the 
public sector satisfy the thirst for safety and liquidity on the part of the owners 
of those assets, but do not involve those groups without financial holdings. 
When the weight of bad debts is too big, and/or their contractionary effects 
have been allowed to go too far, those illiquid groups are likely to increase 
their nunibers (in particular, through the addition of the unemployed who 
have exhausted their savings), and to re1nain shut away from credit markets. 
In a segmented economy, liquid agents do not find creditworthy individual 
borrowers, while n1any people would be willing to borrow at high rates in 
01der to sustain consumption, or to keep open an enterprise, but do not have 
financing options, even when, on average, they may be expected to regain 
a capacity to generate incomes wl1en the economy recovers. Lenders may be 
risk·averse (see, for exan1ple, Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2003), so that the risk 
compensation they demand may exceed the willingness of borrowers to pay a 
risk premiu1n; a11d this rnay be especially the case if there are large disparities 
in beliefs about the likelihood of a quick recovery on the part of borrowers and 
ler1ders (Stiglitz, 1972, 2013). In the 2008 crisis, the restoration of the balance 
sheet of the banks did not lead a resun1ption of lending, especially to sn1all and 
mediurn-sized enterprises. 
In crises originated in the private sector, macro policies have a role 1nobil-
izing resources to contain the disruptiort, on the basis of their perceived ability 
to obtain future revenues. In public debt crises, the prirnary necessity is to 
restore that ability, and/or reduce government's obligations, real or financial. 
Here, it is the private sector that is going to be asked, or made, to contribute 
in order to equilibrate public finances. If prosperous taxpayers or recipients of 
governmer1t transfers and services are in a position to be called to provide the 
funding, the fiscal adjustrnent need not cause strong macroeconomic pertur-
bations, considering that it may dissipate uncertainties regarding fiscal policies 
and their distributive incidence. riowever, in scenarios where the government 
attempts a large-scale adjustment in a weak eco11orny (as in Argentina in 2001), 
the consequence rnay well be a cumulative process of reduced real activity, 
lower government revenues and further demands for belt tightening. This may 
result in a period of stalernate, where creditors of the state renew t!1eir !ending 
only at still higher interest rates, the governinent struggles under constant 
pressure to pacify lenders for some tirne, and tl1e economy stagnates at a low 
activity level, while few can believe that the debt will be honored, especially 
given the large interest burden (cf. Calvo, 1988). But, without a deus ex machina, 
the final outcome is likely to be a bang - a debt crisis with son1e form of debt 
restructuring. Fiscal adjustments designed to avoid the day of reckoning can 
be self-destructive. 
Crises rnay be so strong that they require large-scale debt reductions in order 
to allow a recovery to take place. There is life after debt, although not neces-
sarily an easy one. 
Debt reduction and life after debt 
Errors, miscalculations and failures of business projects occur all the tin1e in 
11ormally functioning economies. Debt servicing difficulties are handled rou-
tinely by private renegotiations or by formal bankruptcy procedures througl1 
tl1e legal systen1, without causing Inore than low-intensity "background 
noises" for the systen1 as a whole. In a private debt crisis of macroeconomic 
importance, the current problems and the future prospects of individual debt 
repayment are intricately coupled together. This implies that a case-by-case, 
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decentralized approach to dealing with a mass of probletnatic debts would 
result in a cumbersome process, during which the ownership and the access to 
resources re1nains doubtful, and where there is apt to be much heterogeneity in 
the criteria used in different rulings (until, possibly, they are so1nehow unified 
by a high-level judicial decision), with an uncertain aggregate outcome. 
Reciprocally, a "decision frorn above" (like the annuhnent of the gold clause in 
US bonds in the 1930s, or the "pesification" of dollarized assets and liabilities 
of the Argentine banks in 2002) could contribute to a recovery by reducing 
debts at once (at least provisionally, since these decisions are still subject to 
legal review), and freeing resources for spending and production. 
At the same time, n1easures of that type represent a dra1natic intervention 
in existing agreements, and they bring about wealth redistributions. Those 
who Jose out will argue for the sanctity of contracts, the risks associated with 
such "abrogation of contracts," and that the actions are unnecessary for macro-
economic purposes. Advocates of such restructurings contend that all legal 
frameworks contain an explicit or implicit provision that contracts are not 
enforceable in certain unanticipated extreme events - and crises are exan1ples 
of such extreme events; and that countries that seem n1ired in distress often do 
recover dramatically after such debt restructurings, even when they are outside 
the pre-existing legal frameworks. More generally, many of the other actions 
governinents and private parties take are outside pre-existing legal frameworks: 
had those been adhered to, arguably tlte US bailout and foreclosure crisis would 
have taken on a very shape, 
Sornething similar would apply to sovereign debt restructurings, though 
here, legal frameworks are deficient and attempts to develop an international 
"Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism" have, so far, failed. In son1e 
instances (for example, the US following World War II), debt reduction 111ay 
take place gradually, possibly with the help of mild inflations and measures 
to constrain interest rates (Reinhart and Sbrancia, 2011). Hyperinflation has 
operated in some episodes as a brutal n1echanis1n for reducing the real value 
of debts, but this requires the pre-existence of bonds with domestic cur-
rency denornination, as in the defeated Central Powers after World War L But 
often an unmanageable debt overhang leads into an explicit interruption of 
payments. Government defaults are traumatic events, which tend to occur 
when an economy has reacl1ed a state of distress, and non-payment appear 
more or less unavoidable. Perhaps for that reason, the measured econon1ic costs 
of government defaults appear, on average, not too large, or long-lived.27 
Debt restructurings involve nu1nerous players: national governments and 
their constituencies and bondholders, do1nestic and international; but also 
foreign gover111nents and international organizations, with different degrees of 
interest and influence in the proceedings according to the case. The observed 
outcomes of these complicated games cover a wide range of operations with 
different characteristics, going from rapid "friendly" bond swaps with small 
haircuts to protracted negotiations with large debt reductions. Froin the point 
of view of the debtor country, there is some evidence that the costs of default 
increase with the rnagnitude of the "haircut" involved in a restructuring 
(Cruces arid Trebesch, 2011).28 But sustainability is a crucial consideration: 
restarting from a precarious position because of an insufficiently deep debt 
restructuring would raise the eventuality of a new crisis; a prospect that should 
be frightening also to creditors. Debt reductions are part of the emergency kit 
of economic policies. 
Econornies do recover after crises, and so1netimes quite rapidly, if the debt 
overhang is dealt with, However, regaining peak levels of incorne typically 
takes a considerable number of years, and it is common for aggregate output 
not to return back to the trend line that would result from extrapolating peak 
values with pre-crisis rates of increase (Cerra and Saxena, 2008; also Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2014). But, of course, this is true for any deep recession - there is, 
at best, very limited "mean reversion."29 The accumulated gaps indicate the 
substantial wealth losses with respect to what may be have expected during the 
boom. Once the economy has rebounded, the dran1atic urgencies of the crisis 
give way to the more mundane, but non-trivial problems of turning a recovery 
into sustained growth. 
Contents of this volume 
The analysis of debt crises poses questions at different levels, from the char-
acteristics of individual behavior in large social ups and downs to the func-
tioning of the international system when a country or groups of countries goes 
through econontic turbulence, In this book v.<e concentrate on some aspects of 
the processes involved, emp.hasizing the relevance of international compari~ 
sons and the interest in exploring policies and instruments to deal with crises 
and to resolve debt defaults. 
The first paper of tl1e volume, by Joseph Stiglitz, presents an overview of ana-
lytical issues concerning the behaviors and mechanisrns that generate macro-
economic crises and the associated policies. It sets the scene by placing the 
theory of crises within the context of standard economic tl1eory. It focuses 
on three central questions: Given that the state variables tl1at describe the 
economy (for exarnple, the capital stock, the level of human capital, the amount 
of natural capital) chatige slowly, why is it that the state of the economy -
levels of output and employrnent - ca11 change very rapidly? Why is it that 
the natural equilibrating mechanisms don't seem to work, that is, why is it 
that adjustments in wages, prices, and interest rates often don't restore the 
economy quickly to full employment, and often n1ove the economy further 
away,. and why is it that debt so often precipitates crises? As we noted, debt 
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sitnply represents claims on existing resources, and in standard theory, there 
should exist a full employment equilibrium regardless of the distribution of 
endowments (clahns). But evidently, the distribution of claim~ does 1natter. 
The general insights provided by this theoretical analysis are then applied to 
provide an interpretation of the euro crisis. Stiglitz argues that there are fun-
damental structural flaws in the design of the Euro Zone (though the policy 
responses, including excessive austerity, have exacerbated the magnitude of 
the dowr1turn); on the basis of this analysis, he proposes a set of structural 
reforms. 
Martin Guzman stresses in his comn1ent the problems of models of full 
information rational expectations in accou1lting for the actual occurrence of 
debt crises, especially in middle-incorne highly volatile economies (Guzman, 
2013). Those models cannot rnatch quantitatively the observed frequencies 
of default; moreover, their assumed evolution of expectations is inconsistent 
with survey data in those economies. The comments also point out that crises 
are associated with substantial chatiges in the structure of the econornies that 
modify the value of variables sucl1 as hu1nan capital. Therefore, an analysis of 
the reconfigurations of econon1ies associated with debt crises would require a 
recalculation of the value of stocks. 
The second part of the book includes papers that review international expe-
riences of macroeconomic crises, particularly in Latin America, in order to 
draw analytical implications. 
Jose Antonio Ocampo analyzes the Latin American "lost decade" of the 1980s 
f~om the perspective of a comparison with the performance of the region in 
the Great Depression of the 1930s. He notes that the episode of the 1980s was 
especially severe, even taking into account the historical volatility of the Latin 
American economies, and remarks that this was a crisis of the developing 
world, while that of the 1930s was global in scope. Ocampo stresses the strong 
changes in the behavior of the supply of credit to the region, associated with a 
broader redefinition of the international capital market that took shape since 
the 1960s, a process marked by the increased activity of large banks in inter-
national financing, Measures of domestic financial liberalization throughout 
the region (especially in the Southern Cone) facilitated the intermediation 
of international funds to domestic borrowers, with governrnents also taking 
active roles. The author remarks that, in the expansive phase, the demand for 
credit was stin1ulated by low interest rates on foreign loans and high com-
rnodity prices. 
That scenario was drastically modified when in 1979 tl1e US raised its interest 
rate steeply to attack inflation. Tl1is affected not only the conditions of new 
borrowing but also that of mat1y outstanding debts, contracted at variable 
interest rates. Simultaneously, cotnmodity prices fell sharply. The paper indi-
cates that the respor1se of trade flows and real output in tl1e region after the 
international shock was quite different in the 1930s and the 1980s. In the first 
case, while the purchasing power of exports fell abruptly, recovering only par~ 
tially after some years, the trade surplus showed a relatively mild cycle, and in 
less than a decade had returned to pre-crisis levels (as proportion of exports). 
By contrast, in the more recent episode, the exports did not contract, while the 
trade surplus shifted upwards and remairted at much higher levels. In the Great 
Depression, GDP dropped substantially at first, but also recovered rapidly. In 
the 1980s, the fall was less intense, but so was the recovery: ten years after the 
peak, per capita GDP had not returned to its original levels. 
Ocampo singles out as a critical ele1nent of these different perforn1ances the 
dissimilar ways in which the foreign debt oved1ang was dealt with in each 
case. In the 1930s, most countries defaulted on their outstanding bonds; the 
reduced debt burdens allowed a rebound of imports, which opened the roorn 
for stronger levels of domestic dernand. By contrast, in the 1980s, the debt in 
difficulties was held n1ainly by international banks. These banks established 
a committee which, Ocampo remarks, rnay have facilitated negotiations but 
at the same time, operated as a cartel of creditors with the backing of their 
governrnents (the US in particular), facing a set of uncoordinated debtors. 
With this bargaining setup, debtor countries were thrown into long and costly 
adjustment until, eventually, banks had made provisions against losses, the 
prablem was recognized as one of solvency, and the debt was restructured with 
write-offs. 
Thus, the paper stresses the relevance of the tnanagement of the debt crises in 
both instances, and that of the international environrnent. The 1nore elaborate 
financial architecture of the 1980s did not contribute to a resolution of the 
crisis, but promoted recessionary conditions and policies. Oca1npo concludes 
that the international systetn should put in place an institutional fra1nework 
that includes a debt workout rnechanisni. 
Pablo Sanguinetti argues in his co1nrnent that the sequence of reforms 
(where financial liberalizations took precedence) may have contributed to the 
vulnerability of Latin American economies in the 1980s; he also suggests that 
the memory of previous defaults could have influenced the form of foreign 
financing to the region and pron1ote the concentration of the lending through 
banks. He remarks that the recreation of bond markets in the 1990s took place 
after the Brady plan, which incorporated guarantees in the for1n of US treas-
uries on the principals of the new debt issties. Sanguinetti concurs on the desir-
ability of mechanisms for debt relief coordinated between governn1ents artd 
multilateral organizations. 
The paper by Roberto Frenkel revisits the case of Latin America in the 1980s 
and compares its features with those of the Euro Zone crisis. Frenkel finds that 
both processes corresponded to the cycles analyzed by Minsky (1975), where opti-
rnistic expectations induce agents to lend and to borrow, leading to an expansior1 
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where balance sheets become increasingly fragile; the reversion occurs when 
sorne negative signal leads players to undo asset holding positions and express 
strong liquidity preferences; pessimisrn may becorne self-reinforcing. 
Frenkel identifies several common characteristics in the Latin An1erican 
and Euro Zone episodes. As central triggers of the boorns he identifies 1nacro-
econornic policies that favor foreign borrowir1g (financial liberalization and 
fixed or quasi-fixed exchange rates in Latin A1nerica, the introduction of the 
common currency in the euro periphery), together with lax financial regu-
latiorL The author also finds that the econon1ies followed similar stylized 
dynamics, as lower domestic interest rates stirnulated the growth of internal 
demand, together with real appreciations, until a 1noment where doubts 
emerged, current account deficits became harder to finance, capital inflows 
stopped, or got reversed, and the financial system came under attack. In Latin 
America, this was combined with currency crises. Devaluation removed the 
real over-appreciation, but increased the burden of foreign currency liabilities. 
This nlechanism was absent in the Euro Zone, although deflationary pressures 
also con1plicated the repayn1ent of debts. 
Another analogy between the episodes that the paper stresses is the tight-
ening of fiscal policies in the downward phase of the cycle. In the Latin 
Arnerican case, Frenkel refers to IMF conditionality, while pointing that the 
European U11ion adopted similar criteria with its peripheral n1ernbers in dif-
ficulty, perhaps because of a n1isplaced belief tl1at efforts for fiscal consoli-
dation would have an expansionary effect. f'renkel notes that adjustrnents in 
the midst of crises have resulted in falling output, high risk pre1niums and 
worsening debt ratios. 
Regarding prevention, he argues for strengthening financial regulations and 
recommends measures in three areas: the adoption of exchange regirnes which 
allow flexibility in policymaking and facilitate international competitiveneSs; 
management of capital flows; and actions to bolster external robustness 
including the accumulation of foreign reserves. 
Roberto Bebczuk focuses his co1nment on the argurnent that crises derive 
from a combination of three policies: pegged exchange rates, unrestricted 
capital mobility and financial deregulation (what he names IT: the "implausible 
trinity"). (He suggests that the empirical evidence does not in fact show high 
degrees of international capital mobility, as indicated by the association between 
national savings and Investment and low cross- country consumption corre-
lations.) Bebczuk indicates that, given the potential instabilities of financial 
markets, IT can be a dangerous policy; however, doing away with IT would 
not elhninate the risk of crises with weak institutions and deficit- prone public 
sectors. Regarding the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policies during downswings, he 
argues that, rather than a policy decision, it results from the lack of access to 
resources by governments that did not economize in the expansive phase. 
The contribution of Stephany Griffith-Jones concentrates on the European 
crisis, witl1 references to Latin An1erica in the 1980s. She states that one of the 
key lessons from the Latin An1erican experience is that austerity policies without 
tin1ely debt reduction lead to drastic recessions and transfers costs from credi~ 
tors to debtors and from private creditors to public actors, since official lending 
tends to finance debt servicing. Griffith-Jones says that these lessons were not 
taken into account in Europe, with the exception of the restructuring of the 
Greek debt, which many consider insufficient and so1newhat late. However, 
she observes a growing acknowledgment of tl1e real costs of adjustment, for 
example in the recognition hy the IMF (2012b) that the downward fiscal multi-
pliers seern much larger than had been expected. 
Griffith-Jo11es argues for a European-wide action to promote growth recovery, 
and discusses several possible mechanisms. One would be to mobilize struc-
tural funds of the EU, the disbursement of which, the author indicates, has 
been limited by the difficulty of governrnents to provide co-financing. In order 
to achieve leverage, Griffith-Jones proposes to use part of the EU budget as risk 
buffer for project financing, where the European Investment Bank (EIB) could 
play a key role. Using the HEIMDAL model (cf. Hansen a11d Bjorsted, 2012), she 
estimates the potential effect of those injections in the aggregate output and 
employment of the European cou11tries. 
1'he argument also underlines a need for more expansive fiscal policies 
across the EU. This could be achieved in part by reductions in debt servicing 
for countries in financial troubles. Griffith-Jones discusses ECB interventions 
through large purchases of sovereign debts. She finds that suclt actions would 
be especially useful if the reluctance of investors to hold the bonds of some 
countries originates from unfounded fears, but notes that, if the debt problems 
are not solved, ultin1ate insolvencies could iinply 1nassive tra11sfers of losses 
to the ECB. The paper also suggests exploring ways to allow postponement 
of debt service until ecortomies start growing. Countries witl1 policy space, 
like Germany and (to a certain extent) the UK, Griffith-Jones argues should 
have slower fiscal consolidation and higher wage increases. She argues that 
the UK has faced substantial output costs fron1 its early fiscal adjustment in a 
weak econo1uy, as opposed to what would have happened had it waited until a 
recovery had taken shape. 
Hernitr1 Seoane also stresses in his comment that the Latin American expe-
riences show a high cost of austerity policies that are not accompanied hy a 
restructuring of excessive debts, a fact which seems to have been ignored in 
the recent European case. Regarding the tnodellng a11d quantification of the 
effects of fiscal policies, he argues that it is useful to consider explicitly the 
varying nature of macroeconon1ic volatility, and particularly the fact that it 
tends to increase in periods of crises. Seoane notes, in addition, that fiscal 
multipliers seen1 to be stronger ir1 recessions than expa11sions (cf. Auerbach 
and Gorodnichenko, 2010); this implies that the in1pacts of contractionary 
measures in times of distress rnay in fact be quite large. 
The papers Jn Part Ill of the book approach sovereign debt restructurings 
from two angles. Rohan Pitchford and Mark Wright consider a game-theoretic 
setup where a debtor t1egotiates with several groups of creditors, in a weak 
contractual environment, characterized by limited con1rnitment, enforcen1ent 
and verifiability. Their rnain interest is to explain delays in closing restruc-
turing agreen1ents. 
In a first setting, without CACs (Collective Action Clauses) in the bond 
contracts, sovereigns cannot make credible pron1ises not to offer better deals 
to holdouts than the ones obtained by the earlier conceding creditors, while 
holdouts are able to impose costs or1 tl1e debtor. This creates a strategic 1notiv-
ation for some bondholders to delay an agree1ner1t. In the end, if creditors are 
identical ex ante, the gain that the first entrants in the restructuring realize 
by being paid rapidly is just offset by the higher payment that the holdouts 
are able to extract; the first rounds of bargaining, between the debtor and 
the creditors wi10 decide to participate early is conducted "in the shadow" of 
future expected concessions to the holdouts. The delay would be longer the 
larger the number of creditor players. 
The argument can be rnodified to account for heterogeneities among cred-
itors: if "vultures" (late negotiators) are represented as agents with stronger 
bargaining power, their presence increases delay; the same happens if they are 
assumed to be comparatively patient birds. In the setup where the provisions 
of the debt in default included CACs, the strategic incentive for holding out 
vanishes, because the payment that all creditors will receive front the restruc-
turing process is fixed once a critical rnass has accepted a deal. f"Iowever, the 
authors point out, creditors would find a free riding motive for staying out 
of the bargaining, since those creditors who participate in the restructuring 
negotiations incur costs. 
In his co1nment, Federico Weinschelbaum notes that the game in the 1nodel 
starts at the renegotiation phase, taking default as given. He suggests extending 
the analysis to the pre-crisis stage, as behavior would be influenced by the 
anticipated costs of default, which depend on the bargaining delay, 
In the other paper of Part II, Benu Schneider discusses alternative insti-
tutional setups for the renegotiation of country debts, with reference to the 
debates surrounding the proposal of Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanisn1 
(SDRM) in the early 2000s. In tf1is respect, she notes that, while no agreen1ent 
emerged about the need for an international bankruptcy regime, the discus-
sions around the SDRM stimulated changes in new bond contracts, especially 
regarding the increasing use of CAC (see also IMF, 2012). However, she points 
that the ongoing debt troubles in Europe and the continued litigation on the 
Argentine obligations (n1ore than ten years since default, and after two rounds 
of bond swaps that normalized over 90 percent of the debt i11 question) have 
stimulated the perception that tl1e current (non-)system is costly to various 
stakeholders and, consequently, there is a renewed interest in developing 
improved fra1neworks for orderly restructuring. 
Schneider finds several problems in existing arrangements, associated with 
a history of past debt renegotiations with delays and substantial chances of 
multiple restructurings for some countries, suggesting that the debt reduction 
in the original deals were too small. Among the shortcon1ings of curreJtt con-
tractual mechanisms, she includes weaknesses in aggregation across bond 
issues, and ambiguities in the meaning of pari passu clauses requiring equitable 
treatrnent an1ong creditors (which, in the Argentine case, were interpreted by 
US Courts as mandating full payment to holdouts); she also points to equity 
issues (for example, .between official and private creditors) and uncertainties 
about triggers of credit default swaps. 
The analogy between domestic bankruptcy for firms and debt restruc-
turing for national states, states Schneider, cannot be pushed too far: issues 
concernir1g the delegation of sovereignty are bound to present intrinsic dif-
ficulties. Also noticeable is the diversity of interests a11d perceptions of the 
variety of institutions and groups which are relevant in those debates (see also 
Setser, 2010). The heterogeneity may also reflect intra-country tensions (for 
example, between banks and taxpayers), and even conflicting considerations 
by the Sarne actor. En;erging economies, for instance, n1ay see themselves as 
borrowers seeking access to funds, debtors who may become u11able to pay, or 
IMF members wishing to preserve the availability of official financing (or who 
have grown distrustful of its conditionality, as the case maybe). The IMF is cast 
in dual roles as creditor and arbiter and it is not clear what are in practice, and 
should be in principle, its objectives and criteria when weighing the welfare 
and interests of debtor countries, private lenders and its own shareholders. 
Schneider discusses alternative arrangeme11ts to facilitate debt renegotiations 
that would allow cou11tries a "fresl1 start" to recover after a crisis and cor1tribute 
to a fair outcome after unavoidable defaults while maintaining repayment 
incentives in ways that do not discourage lending (cf. Stiglitz, 2010a). The 
options that she considers range from improvements in contractual design 
to formal statutory regirnes. In the first dimensior1, she argues for standard-
izi11g pari passu provisions to strengthen the position of participating credi-
tors relative to holdouts; she also considers aggregation clauses (which would 
apply provisions like collective action clauses across bond issues, instead of 
limiting them to single instruments30); also discussed (with son1e reservations) 
is the possibility of including standstills clauses (temporary payme11t suspen-
sions) for use in emergencies. While stakeholders do not seenl likely to agree 
on a fully institutionalized mechanis1n, Schneider notes that bilateral (debt-
or-creditor) deals may be easier and more efficient if there is some outside 
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facilitator. In the context of Europe the paper suggests possible amendments to 
the Stability Mechanism (ESM), particularly to protect debtors under an ESM 
from claims by creditors who stay out of the restructuring process (see also 
Brookings Institution, 2013). 
In his comn1ent, Fernando Navajas returns to the Argentine case as an illus-
tration of the uncertainties of the debt restructuring process and the limita-
tions of the non-statutory approach. He suggests that changes in the written 
tern1s of debt contracts should not be viewed as substitutes for institutional 
reforms aimed at improving the mechanisms of debt renegotiation, and notes 
that initiatives in that direction tend to get blocked by creditor interests. 
Part IV of the volume contains papers on policies and instruments to deal 
with crises. Included in tl1e discussion is a theme that comes back fron1 the 
previous part, the design of the debt contracts. 
Marcus Miller and Lei Zhang analyze issues related to tl1e Euro Zone crisis. 
The first refers to the ECB policy of "Outright Monetary Transactions" (OM1'; 
also known as "Draghi put", after the ECB President) aimed at sustaining the 
n1arkets for sovereign bonds, through direct purchases if necessary. The authors 
note, along with De Grauwe and Ji (2012), that the interest rate spreads on 
the bonds of countries in the Euro Zone periphery during 2010-11 were con-
siderably higher than those observed for other economies with siinilar debt/ 
GDP ratios. They interpret this behavior as suggesting the possible existence 
of negative expectations capable of self-fulfillment by driving countries to bad 
equilibriums, as modeled in Calvo (1988). In these scenarios, anticipations 
of default may be self-validating because, with high interest rates, the public 
sector will not generate the primary surpluses required to service the debt, but 
there is also common knowledge that the government would be solvent if the 
interest rate on its debt is low, nearer the risk-free rate, so that there is a feasible 
equilibrium with anticipated a11d actual full payment. In that case, indications 
that interest on the debt will be low would act as coordinating devices, and 
actually lead prospective lenders into the market. Miller a11d Zhang consider 
that the announcement of the OMT operated in that way, inducing reductions 
in the yields for countries like Italy and Spain even without intervention by 
the ECB. 
Nevertheless, Ntiller and Zhang note that countries around Europe seern to 
have been trapped in a costly signaling game, trying to woo capital markets by 
taking measures of fiscal austerity, with negative consequences for growth. The 
authors suggest that, ir1stead of insisting on fiscal co11solidation in depressed 
economies, attention should focus on relieving co11tractionary pressures on 
highly indebted countries by coordinated regional actions to manage the size 
and timing of demanded repayments. They also re1nark that instruments that 
link debt payments to the growth performance of the economy would help in 
facilitating repayrnent in a context of economic recovery but (together with 
Grlffith-Jo11es and Sharma, 2009), they indicate that the market 1nay give too 
low values to such obligations. They suggest, in the European context, that 
GDP-contingent securities 1nay be taken at the beginning by an official agency, 
until the time when growth prospects of the debtor countries are reestablished. 
That agency would hold both si1nple and growth-linked bonds, and issue supra-
national "Eurobonds," guaranteed by the European treasures; countries that 
borrow from that institution would be subject to strict conditionality. 
The com1nent by Alfredo Schc!arek points out that a crucial condition for 
putting in place a cooperative international mechanisn1 to deal with debt 
problems like those of Europe would be to n:iake the governn:1ents of the coun-
tries that would provide the backing, and their constituencies, perceive that it 
is in their own collective interest to participate. He also notes the in1portance 
of defining the lending policy of the proposed agency, and the criteria that 
would be used in cases where restructuring may stilt be required. In discussing 
the forrns that conditionality may take, Schclarek finds that no consensus has 
en1erged in Europe about the implementation of growth-restoring policies; 
rather debtor countries have been induced to apply costly adjustn1ents. 
The paper by Barr, Bush and Pienkowski studies the potential of explicitly 
contingent obligations, and specifically GDP-linked bonds, to mitigate inef-
ficiencies and uncertainties that arise with conventional instru1nents of sov-
ereign debt. The analysis is based on a rnodel of debt with endogenous default 
(cf. also Ghosh et al., 2011). The economy is subject to two shocks: one on the 
debt-GDP ratio (interpreted as events when the government takes on previ-
ously off*balance sheet liabilities), while the other induces a transitory shift 
in the growth rate of GDP. !n the calibrations, the distribution of GDP shocks 
is taken fron1 actual data, with large skewness and kurtosis (cf. Schularick and 
Taylor, 2012). Governrnent bonds f1ave a one-period niaturity. The interest rate 
is determined by an arbitrage condition; with risk-neutral lenders, the expected 
return equals an exogenous risk-free rate. 
Fiscal policies are described by a reaction function that increases the primary 
balance (as proportion of GDP) with the value of interest pay1nents due (with a 
response parameter exceeding unity) but with a limit that marks the maxin1um 
possible "fiscal effort." If contractual debt services exceed that bound, the gov-
ernment defaults and the debt is cut by a given (fixed) fraction. The interest 
rate is calculated at each debt level according to the probability that, consid-
ering the distribution of shocks, the debt in the next period exceeds a critical 
level, where default occurs with certainty. In this setting, the introduction of 
GDP-linked bonds (represented in the paper as constituting the whole arnount 
of the debt) removes the effect of growth shocks on government liabilities. 
Consequently, the volatility of the debt is reduced; this irnp!ies in turn lower 
probabilities of default and srnaller interest spreads at all debt levels. The debt 
limit is increased. 
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However, the authors note, those results do not take into account the interest 
differential that lenders would require to buy contingent bonds. They propose 
another exercise where lenders are represented as agents witl1 constant relative 
risk aversion preferences, whose V>'ealth consists of a portfolio of GDP-linked 
and risk-free bonds. In the numerical results, debt limits remain substantially 
higher with cor1tingent bonds than with formally unconditional debts. The 
calculated risk premiun1s on GDP-linked bonds are quite low; the authors 
mention that the actual levels of co1npensation required may be much larger 
(see the literature on asset return puzzles, for example, Weitzn1an, 2007). The 
paper indicates that, irl any case, with risk spreads on GDP· linked bonds of 
around 3.5 percent (which the model associates with an extremely high coeffi-
cient of risk aversion), the debt ceiling would still be larger than with conven-
tional instruments. The exercise is extended to a case with endogenous GDP, 
negatively related to the primary surplus as an indicator of fiscal adjustment. 
The paper concludes that contingent debts seeni to have interesting properties, 
which can enhance the ability of countries to avoid crises, although costs and 
obstacles not included in the model should be assessed. 
Enrique Kawaniura co1nrnents that it would be useful to explore the deter-
mination of "fiscal fatigue," represented in the paper by an exogenous ceiling 
for primary surpluses. He also suggests studying variants of the government's 
reaction function. He notes that the specification of GDP-linked bonds in cases 
like that of Argentina conte1nplated payments varying non-linearly with GDP, 
starting from a minimum growth rate. Kawamura finds that the analysis of 
the ways in which agents (lenders, in particular) evaluate and respond to risks, 
and their effects on asset prices, would be a topic deserving future research; he 
notes that relaxing the rational expectations assumption would be especially 
useful in the context of economic crises. 
The paper by Daniel I-!eymann and Axel Leijonhufvud closes the volu1ne 
with a discussion of various dimensions of the decision problems faced by 
policy makers in the development and resolution of macroeconomic debt 
crises. '[hey note that the defining characteristic of those crises is that for-
mally unconditional obligations will not be fulfilled; nun1erous prornises 
and socially validated expectations are likely to be broken. The initial policy 
responses may mobilize more or less standard macroeco11omic instrurnents. 
However, when 1nassive defaults threaten, policies must explicitly or irnplicitly 
face unpalatable choices about the allocation of losses. These decisions have 
to be taken in a highly uncertain environn:ient since a crisis manifests a wide-
spread frustration of expectations, and it may leave a durable impact on the 
configuration arid perfor1nance of the economy. 
·rhe authors stress that 1nacroecono1nic policies adapted to a specific 
case are predicated on evaluations of the nature and intensity of shocks 
and the conditions that deter1ni11e the econon1y's responses. Extraordinary 
macroeconornic disturbances may call for strong, urgent, policy reactions; a 
history of stable, predictable behavior in normal times will enhance the cap-
acity of policy makers to act in an emergency, particularly by sustair1ing the 
dernand for money and public debt. In a private debt crisis, solvent goverr1-
rnents are likely to respond first through large doses of monetary policies. 
These measures can prevent the development of default avalanches; however, 
they may have undesirable distributive consequences, and their effectiveness 
would depend on the degree of credit market segrnentation which has taken 
place. f-Ieyrnann and Leijor1hufvud note that, when private sector expec-
tations are very pessimistic about the repayment capacity of prospective 
debtors, policies that raise the price of low- risk bo11ds will not provide much 
stimulus to demand. The spending gap can be addressed by fiscal policies, 
as long as the governnient has access to cheap financing. But, they remark, 
for this to work, insolvencies must not have spread too far. If they have, 
there will be a redefinition of large masses of rights and obligations. This will 
happen whatever the stance taken by policymakers; but at the very least poli-
cyrnakers should be aware of this and of the potential consequences of what 
they do on tl1e outcomes. This is likely to entail difficult tradeoffs between 
hands-off approaches and direct action through bailouts or interventions 
that redefine the terms of cor1tracts. 
Irt discussing sovereign debt crises, fieyrnann and Leijonhufvud remark 
that defaults tend to happen in extren1e situations, and not without strenuous 
efforts to avoid them. Even so, ample room for disagreernents bet>veen debtor 
and creditors are likely to ren1ain. Since the prospect of relapse into payment 
difficulties would be particularly worrisome, sustainability should be a central 
consideration in debt restructuring. 
The paper briefly discusses the analytical implications of macroeconornic 
crises. The authors observe that the study of crises has a somewhat paradoxical 
aspect: the expectations driving the process, and which eventually become 
disappointed, are often based on ecor1omic theories prevalent at the times. The 
theory of crises must then contemplate how economic analysis itself rr1ight go 
wrong. 
Jorge Carrera emphasizes in his comments the international dimensions of 
crises, particularly in the recent period, when the disturbance started at the 
center of the global system. He remarks that internatior1al interdependences 
may be stabilizing or destabilizing but, currently, the international financial 
tnultipliers seen1 the rnain c!1annels that propagate negative irnpulses. 
Regarding unsustainable sovereign debts, Carrera notes that scheines that 
allow for early restructurings (rather than prolonging the agony through tran-
sitory official financing) should be irnportant elen1ents of the international 
architecture. I-Ie also points out that rnost systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFJS) have global dimensions and activities, while the regulations 
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that apply to them, if any, are established at the national level, with the con-
sequent lack of coordination and risk of regulatory arbitrage. This situation, 
says Carrera, leaves very powerful global banks facing institutions that lack 
sufficient strengtl1 to regulate them; consequently, more attention should be 
given to international regulation, overcoming the minimalist criteria of the 
Basel rules. 
The comment also identifies as important questions to be addressed the 
regulatory treatment of financial innovations (should they be subject to sorne 
kind of "clinical tests" before being offered to the public?) and the appropriate 
use of capital controls. On domestic policies in recessions, Carrera argues 
for incorne and redistribution policies (including avoidance of labor market 
reforms masking as wage cuts) as cornplenients of fiscal measures; he refers 
to the Japanese experience of the 1990s as a case that shows the importance 
of opportune debt reductions, as their absence seems to have prolonged the 
period of stagnation. The comment underlines the distributive aspects of 
boorn-bust cycles, emphasizing that crises entail broken promises in the for1n 
of defaults on formal debts, but also denials of socially legitimate and perhaps 
Institutionalized claims concerning social and welfare conditions. 
The papers and comments in this volume are diverse in their focus, analytical 
approaches and expositional styles. Given our subject, that is how it should 
be. Like the proverbial elephant, social events such as debt crises cannot be 
described by observing then; from a single angle. At the same time, the different 
contributions share the recognition that macroeconomic crises are a har1nful 
sort of systemic failure and, therefore, call for sustained efforts to in1prove 
rnethods of diagnosis and devise better means of prevention and treatrnent. 
This view implies leaving aside complacent attitudes towards those disrup-
tions, and stresses the practical relevance of addressing without prejudice Icing 
outstanding questions about the scope and the limitations of econo1nic self-
regulating mechanisms, in order to idet1tify features or behaviors that may 
generate fragilities, and look for effective remedies. The appropriate policies 
would depend on the nature and the intensity of the disturbance. Matching 
with some precision circumstances with the desirable actions rernains an open 
task. riowever, it seems clear that large debt overhangs have to be addressed 
somehow: policies based on rnere contractionary adjustnient are likely to 
aggravate the insolvency problems that niotivated them in the first place. And 
dealing explicitly with overhangs involves facing the inevitable distributional 
irr1plications of any way of action. 
This volurne, and the conference from which it originated, were conceived 
in a "learning rnode." Crises are trau1natic reminders to many econo1nic 
agents that the actual econornic scenario 1nay differ considerably from what 
they had in mind when drawing their plans. Analysts have the job of trying 
to understand the workings of an enormous, intricate system t}1at evolves 
through the collective outcome of the willful behavior of people like them-
selves. The "end of history" is not near, either for actual societies or for the 
activity of tnacroeconomic analysis: we hope that this volume has contributed 
to the work waiting ahead. 
Notes 
See, for example, the analysis of the Spanish debt during the reign of Philip JI 
(1556-98) in Drelichman and Voth (2013); in addition to discussing instances of 
payn1ent suspension and debt renegotiation, this paper highlights the use by that 
government of risk- sharing instruments in the form of contingent contracts (such as 
obligations payable upon arrival of the silver fleet). 
2 See, for example, Stiglitz (2002). 
3 See Stiglitz (2000, 2001), Battiston et al. (2007), Miller and Stiglitz (1999, 2010c, 
2010d). 
4 At the time of the East Asia crisis, many American officials held their own country 
up as an example of transparency. Nonetheless, the US subsequently brought on the 
most severe crisis in eighty years. Many would argue, however, that the US financial 
markets are far from a rr1odel of transparency, and it was partly because they were so 
non-transparent that there was a crisis. See Stiglitz (2010b). 
S The US 2008 crisis involved both new financial products and bad conventional 
lending, though the extent of excessive mortgage lending may have been affected by 
the non-standard (but hardly high-tech) rr1ortgage products. 
6 It is worth noting that the individual countries in Europe, such as Greece, can be 
thought of as borrowing in a "foreign" currency, in the sense that the country cannot 
simply print money to repay its debt. 
7 If they have only short-tern1 debt, interest rates will rlse concomitantly with the 
increase in inflation, and there will thus be little benefit. More generally, debtors 
benefit from inflation only if (a) debt is not indexed; and (b) inflation is greater than 
anticipated. By the same token, inflation at rates lower than what was anticipated 
increases the burden of debt. While many economists have accordingly recognized 
the dangers of deflation, problems arise even when there is inflation, so long as the 
inflation ls less than anticipated. 
8 In this regard, credit crises bear no resemblance with first generation rr1odels of runs. In 
the classic argument of Krugman (1979) a sudden fall in international reserves marks the 
anticlpated end of a currency peg which everyone knows from the start will end at that 
particular date. The massive purchase of foreign exchange simply reflects a predictable 
adjustment of 1noney demand given that at that n1oment price increases (driven by 
the persistent creation of domestic credit by the central bank) will accelerate, once the 
domestic currency is left to float. There are no disturbances to outstanding contracts: 
noininal yields on loans will have incorporated with precision the shift frorn fixed to 
floating rates. It seems difficult to identify a crisis in that scenario. 
9 Alan Greenspan's famous rein ark, in testimony before Cor1gress on the crisi5, that there 
was a "flaw" in his reasoning illustrates the point: "I n1ade a n1lstake irl presuming 
r~~~·~~~ 
,--~ that the self-interest of orga1uzattons, specifically banks and others, were such as 
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0$ that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders and their equity ui 
-~:t the firms." I-louse Committee on Oversight and Government Reforrn, hearings on 
,',,* "The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators," October 23, 2008. 
:':1 1 o See http://www.theguardlan.com/uk/2012/dec/13/queen-financlal-crisis-question. 
::'.-'} The news report went on to rnention that: "ls thfef•]rn
0
ano_thder comi?g;, The Duke of 
~ Edinburgh joked, before warning them IBOE sta : on t o it again. 
1E 11 Even tf the country's underlying physical assets remain the same, there is a reduction 
-'ij in the value of those assets, because the present discounted value of future revenues 
:\f to be derived from them is lower. So1ne of this wealth may be based on inconsi.>tent 
::~ beliefs - some individuals believe that they are i.vealthier than they are because they 
--t believe housing prices will continue tori sc, but other$ believe that they <'Ire wealthy ;~ because they have made a bet that housing prices will go down, and tlley feel con-
_,-; fident that their view of the world will prevail. In the end, one of these two views 
'.'I :~~r~~;:!l~~~~~~:~~~:.nt, there can be a large destruction of what Stig!itz (2013) 
--i 12 The statement leaves out cases of opportunistic (or strategic) default. ln fact, crises are 
-'.-1 typical theaters for confidence games. Unscrupulous traders sell junk bonds to unsus-
~ peeling pensioners, investors who should have known better place their assets in '.he 
hands of financial sharks, ending in escapes to nowhere or resounding bankruptcies; 
these are familiar images. Sometimes, the intent to deceive seems to have been there 
from the start (as with the adventurer Gregor McGregor, who invented the imaginary 
Central Arnerican country of l'oyais, the papers of which were actively traded in 
the early 1820's, before the 1825 panic); in other instances, the mix between fraud 
and mistakes may look more nuanced, and possibly variable over the career of the 
individuals or the course of their schemes. In any case, macro crises generally evoke 
the feeling that people have been swindled, and that the crux of the matter is theft 
of resources. However, a macroeconomically relevant generation of bad debts seems 
unlikely to occur only or mainly as a result of actual fraud. Fisher (1933) discussed 
the point: "When it is too late, the dupes discover scandals ... But probably these 
frauds could never have become so great without the original starters of real oppor-
tunities to invest lucratively. There is always a very real basis for the 'new era' psych-
ology before it runs away with al! its victin1s." Still, as Kindleberger (1978) arg~e5, 
fraud has played an i1nportant role in many crashes. In 2008, deception, bordenng 
on fraud, played an important role in the housing crisis, and the rating agencies, 
investment banks, and others in the financial sector have been accused of fraudulent 






13 In economics where a large number of contracts are written in foreign currencies, 
!n particular, the solvency of debtors will be influenced by the path of the real 
exchange rate, in addition to the domestic purchasing power of earnings. 
14 Again, there are models where herding behavior may be evidenced as part of rational 
expectations. But in most crises, such models do not adequately explain the devel-
opment of expectations. This is certainly the case for the 2008 crisis. 
15 Thus, Stig!itz (2010b) describes how at Davos, in 2008, after the housing bubble 
broke, but before the global econon1y went into freefall, the economic leaders had 
said: "Who could have seen this coming"!" In fact, in earlier meetings at Davos, 
several economists had described, with considerable preci~ion, tl1e events as they 
unfolded. There is a large literature in behavioral economics describing how indi-
viduals discount information that is contrary to their beliefs. See Iloff and Stiglitz 
(2010) and the references cited there. 
16 The pen:.eiv~d proximity of a critical point may be 1neasured vividly by the fre-
~uenc~ (HI hmes per month, per week, or per day) with which people who are not 
financial operators check the moveinents in variables like the exchange rate, central 
bank reserves, the volun1e of bank deposits, the interest rate on governrnent debt, or 
the stock price index. 
17 There has been an extensive analysis of bankruptcy avalanches. See (}ale and Allen 
(2001), Cireenwa!d and Stiglitz (2003) and Battiston et aL (2007). 
18 ()f course, in many instances, such as in the Great Depression, monetary authorities 
have been insensitive to the credit contraction. In 2008, thev were, but were unable 
to counter the effects, even with a n1asslve expansion of the,ir own balance sheet. 
19 See, to: example, Allen and Gale (2007), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009); Shin, 
2010; Eggerts5on and Krugman {2012); Geanakoplos (2010); Gorton (2012); Gorton 
and Ordonez (2012); Kiyotaki and Moore (1997); Korinek (2011), Stiglitz (2010c, 
2010d), Battiston et al. (2012a, 2012b), c;al!egati et a!. (2008). 
20 The zero- lower bound on norr1lna! interest rates has been much discussed, but if it 
:"~re the main restriction to a recovery, there would be an easy re1nedy: use tax pol-
1c1es to correct such intertemporal prices. In fact, lower interest rates may actually 
lower aggregate demand, !or example, as a result of distributional effects. 
21 There is a stereotypical image in Argentina at times of crisis or in periods of weak 
growth: that of the architect/engineer who drives a taxi. It would be expected that 
such "career changes" do not happen before a long, unsuccessful search. Also, 
if th~ driver must own his own cab the transition requires the availability of a 
certain amount of resource5. Sirnilar!y, the re-entry of construction workers who 
w~re displaced when housing bubbles burst is not likely to be a smooth process, 
with even more severe macroeconomic consequences because of the sheer numbers. 
()ften,_ new jobs are created in locations that are different from those where old jobs 
a~e be_1ng destroyed. Moving too requires capital individuals may not have, espe-
cially 1n economies like the US where housing rental 1narkets arc thin and esper!a!ly 
when the value of real estate in areas in decline has dirninished. 
22 These macroeconomic externalities are manifestations of a rr1ore general set of 
1narket failures (pecuniary externalities) which arise when there is in1perfect and 
asymmetric information and/or incomplete rnarkets. See Greenwald and Stiglitz 
(1986). 
23 See Stig!itz (2011). 
24 Indeed, one ~f the functions of an international syste1n of sovereign bankruptcy 
ma~ be. :o p_nce. these risk-sharing instru1nents appropriately for the purpose of 
thelf utilization in debt restructuring operations (see Mi!ler and Zhang, 2014, for an 
argun1ent related to the European case). 
25 Debt_ restruct~rlng docs not require government resources; but governments, by 
offering certain "sweeteners'' can facilitate voluntary restructuring. Even bank 
recap.ita!ization does not necessarily require govern1nent resources. The governinent 
can. simultaneously rn;ike a capital investment in the bank and borrow the requisite 
cap1t~l f.rom t?e bank. Of course, there are risk consequences of such an operation. 
And if financial markets focus on only one side of the government's balance sheet 
(it~ !lablliti~s, _not its ~ssets), they wi!! look with disfavor on such an operation. ()ur 
p~i~t here is snnp!y that the government need not have put aside funds prior to the 
cnsis to fund a bank restructuring. 
26 Expansionary fiscal policies include those which transfer current resources to the 
illiqu.id financed by selling bonds to the liquid. Such transfers can be thought of as~ 
substitute for the 1nissing intermediation channel between one set of agents and the 
other, and may stop the propagation of effective demand failures (Leijonhufvud, 
1973). But n1aintalning private spending capacities in the current period can be 
insufficient to bring debtors back to solvency and to ensure that the economy 
remains ilt full employment. 
27 See, for example, Borensztein and Panizza (2008); Cruces and Trebesh (2011); Levy 
Yeyati and Panizza (2011); Sandleris (2012); Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2012). 
28 We 5hou!d emphasize that there are serious econometric problerr1s: countries under-
taking deep haircuts typically face higher leve\5 of debt and more severe macro-
econo1nic problems; n1oreover, the conditions that led to the untoward financial 
situation may persist after the debt restructuring. To ascertain whether or not deeper 
restructurings arc associated with higher costs requires taking adequate account 
of all of these factors. Stiglitz (2010a) has argued, to the contrary, that fio.ancia! 
markets are forward looking, and that to the extent that that is true, deeper debt 
restructurings make the r!sk associated with additional lending less, and thus may 
be associated with higher growth. 
29 Once again, there are difficult econometric issues. Deep and prolonged downturns 
inevitably lead to financial/debt crises. Thus, statements such as that financial 
crises are typically longer lived than non-financial crisis may be true, but silnp!y 
reflect the fact that when there is a large (real) shock to the economy, it results in a 
financial crisis; not surprisingly, large shocks have large and longer lasting effects. 
30 Note that without some kind of an aggregation clause, any vulture fund that bought 
a majority of any single issue of bonds could block a restructuring. 
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